






   
  
   
 
 
Introduction to Merleau-Ponty 
Merleau-Ponty is best known for his focus upon the perceiving body, and 
for his major thesis, Phénoménologie de la perception (Phenomenology of 
Perception, hereafter PhP). For him, the body is neither a passive object, 
nor a subject only in virtue of a constituting consciousness. Concerning 
the subject of perception, he replaces “consciousness with existence, that 
As I'm kicking things off today, I'll begin with a (very) brief and general 
overview of Merleau-Ponty's ideas, then quickly outline the concepts 
around which Donald Landes’ book is organised. After that, I’ll return to 
discussion of La structure du comportement (The Structure of Behaviour, 
hereafter SB), and Landes’ understanding of it—essentially, that the 
paradoxical logic of expression is implicit in even this early work— 
before offering some comments: first, that a possible tension exists 
between Merleau-Ponty’s abiding emphasis upon perception and 
Simondon’s philosophy, a tension that is not insoluble; and that by also 
incorporating Simondon’s notion of being as problematic, we can further 
develop an account of bodily behaviour counter to those, such as 
Dreyfus’, that emphasise smooth equilibriums.
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is, with being in the world through a body”.1 Perception is involvement 
in the world through the medium of a body. As fundamentally embodied, 
and consequently immersed in a spatio-temporal world, it is perspectival. 
The world eludes full and complete apprehension, and extends beyond 
full spatial and temporal awareness. Hence the appearance of things 
shades off into ambiguity and indeterminacy. This mode of appearance 
of things means that they solicit the perceiving body towards their 
‘completion’: the body is continually and implicitly motivated towards 
things as it strives to maintain a grip on experience. This activity is basic 
in the production of subjectivity and objectivity: as perception 
spontaneously and prereflectively ‘traces out’ objects, subjects 
simultaneously ‘find’ themselves in the world and transform things into 
that world. Perceiving subject and object perceived are mutually 
constituted through the mediation of body. Thus, subjects are neither 
outwith the world, nor within it as a mere thing, but inhabit a world of 
already meaningful entities. Throughout, the body is not explicitly 
cognised as a body; it is an opening onto or “point of view on the world”.2 
This world is already apprehended as routes and blockages, tools that 
are intuitive or obscure, places that are habitable or hostile; that is, 
meaningfully, as possible ways of relating to and acting in it. 
 
Introduction to Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression 
For Merleau-Ponty, bodily expression does not make public a thought 
that is already fully possessed, whether by indication (empiricism) or re-
                                               
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald Landes (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 584 n. 23. 
2  Ibid., 73. 
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presentation (intellectualism).3 Rather, words accomplish thought.4 Only 
upon expression is a thought realised, and made available for 
understanding. No interpretative distance exists between expression and 
expressed. Here is something of a paradox: we know what we meant only 
after expressing it. This brings us to Donald Landes’ book. As signalled 
by its title, the book is chiefly concerned with the structure of expression. 
It suggests that this structure is paradoxical, and that paradox is 
necessary for and constitutive of expression, and by extension, 
communication. 
If expression accomplishes nascent meaning, rather than externalising 
an already-determinate internal idea, whence or from what does it 
emerge? Landes draws upon the late Merleau-Ponty to suggest that 
speech, for example, occurs against a background ‘silence’. This silence 
is neither ‘nothingness’ nor “the unspoken and preexisting language of 
thought”, but a latent, superabundant reserve that is both within, and 
overflows, the order of manifest expression: “the felt presence of so many 
possibilities that are never made explicit”.5 
Here Landes takes up the work of Gilbert Simondon.6 For Simondon 
an individual is not self-identical, but exists relative to a dimension he 
calls preindividual. Individual and preindividual are not discrete 
substances, but moments within the individuating process that produces 
                                               
3  Following Merleau-Ponty, Landes suggests that in empiricist and rationalist accounts of 
expression, a word in itself has no meaning: it is either a stimulus that indicates the 
expressed, or an empty envelope for a mental idea. Here, however, expression has meaning. 
4  The same goes for embodied expressions. Blushing neither indicates embarrassment, nor 
represents a discrete mental state, but just is embarrassment. PP 
5  Donald A Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 8. Hereafter MPE. 
6  Gilbert Simondon, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information (Grenoble: 
Editions Jérôme Millon, 2013). Hereafter IL. Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d'existence des 
objets techniques (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 2012). 
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individuals.7 The preindividual describes the reservoir of potential 
‘before’ resolution into an individual, meaning, action, and so forth. 
While logically antecedent, it is in fact neither separate from nor prior to 
individuals, and is retained throughout individuation as potential for 
further transformation. The preindividual has a particular kind of 
equilibrium that Simondon takes up from thermodynamics: this 
equilibrium is neither stable (which, properly understood, entails stasis, 
since all energy has been exhausted) nor unstable (which, lacking 
coherence, is no stability at all), but metastable. Metastability indicates a 
precarious organisation where least modification of some parameter is 
sufficient to provoke transformation. Preindividual being, then, is a 
supersaturated or tensed system, rich in potential energy.8 
Simondon characterises the individuating process as a ‘dephasing’. 
Strictly speaking, the preindividual is without phase: it is a “reservoir of 
intensities and problems”.9 Dephasing begins when tension appears 
between these, that provokes “resolution… and prolongation of those 
tensions in the form of a structure”.10 Individuation is resolution of a 
tension in the preindividual. The individual just is this resolution: a 
partial solution of the operation that instigates it. Finally, this process is 
transductive:11 every individual enters into the preindividual reserve for 
                                               
7  The individual is s “relative reality” in two ‘directions’: not only to the preindividual, but 
also to an ‘associated milieu’ instantiated alongside it. 
8 That is, unlike the constituted individual, it is not self-identical. Accordingly, it is 
inexplicable via the principle of the excluded middle. Simondon, IL 25. 
9  Landes, MLE 25. 
10  “… une re ́solution des tensions premie ̀res et une conservation de ces tensions sous forme 
de structure” Simondon, IL 25. 
11 Becoming does not happen to being, but is being’s propensity to fall out of phase with itself 
and in so doing, to resolve itself. 
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subsequent individuations. All structures remain metastable, retaining 
potential to dephase.12 
Landes, then, understands expression as such a ‘metastable 
equilibrium’. This means that it is “precariously stable”: endlessly 
reconfigured by new expressions that—paradoxically—both draw upon 
and sustain it, take it up in order to surpass it. New expressions 
contribute their own latent possibilities to the precarious equilibrium. 
This is the central paradox of expression, ably captured by the term 
‘coherent deformation’. While a given expression relies upon an 
established order of signification that enfolds past and present, genuine 
expression is also creation that surpasses that order, taking up the 
weight of the past and present in order go beyond them. Poetry works 
within established language, but by some felicitous redistribution or 
deployment of a latent possibility, opens up a new trajectory of sense. 
Expression, Landes holds, comprises a “trajectory of metastable 
equilibriums”.13 A new expression neither negates nor replaces a previous 
one, but prolongs it. This also refers to Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of 
exscription, wherein each expression—or inscription—simultaneously 
exscribes all the latent content that overflows it.14 It prolongs, but points 
away from, the latent, still indeterminate trajectories that sustain it. This 
makes expression inexhaustible in principle, though it may be corralled 
into less open configurations. 
                                               
12  In some states of affairs, however, this potential remains unactualised. 
13  Landes, MLE. 
14  Speech exscribes silence, the visible, the invisible, and so on. Ibid. 
6 
The Structure of Behaviour (1): From Reaction to Comportment 
Now I'll return to Merleau-Ponty and SB. The account of perception I 
described earlier is developed in detail in PhP, and revised further in later 
works. However, SB is a little different. It seeks “to understand the 
relations of consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or even 
social”.15 Like PhP, it seeks an alternative to realism and idealism: it 
proceeds from behaviour as agnostic in respect of these, so as to define it 
anew. Unlike PhP, it eschews phenomenological interrogation for 
philosophical analysis of psychology and physiology. Its principal target 
is mechanistic behaviourism, that, when rejecting Cartesianism, has too 
hastily expunged certain aspects of behaviour. Merleau-Ponty aims to 
reintroduce to behaviour an intentional dimension that is inconceivable 
in mechanistic terms, without also reinstating intellectualist premisses.16 
The book not only rejects certain of behaviourism’s ontological 
presuppositions; chiefly, that nature is the sum of external causal events, 
and that behaviour is explicable via reflex, as a causal reaction to stimuli 
located in physicochemical properties of an object. It also suggests that 
these presuppositions are invalidated by behaviourism’s own findings. 
Merleau-Ponty’s chief conclusion is that biological reactions do not 
reduce to organismic parts or localised stimuli.17 Animals do not exist 
within a world of bare objects that impinge unilaterally and mechanically 
via objective properties. A stimulus only is a stimulus because the 
                                               
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Alden J Fisher (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1967), 1. “By nature we understand here a multiplicity of events external to each 
other and bound together by relations of causality”. 
16 We might say, alluding to the book’s original title, that he will shift from causally-
organised behaviour to meaningfully-organised comportment. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La 
structure du comportement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013). 
17 This does not make necessary an entelechy that organises responses: this presumes that 
there are separate units in need of organisation. 
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organism inaugurates and projects around it a vital environment, or 
Umwelt, that “gives momentary meaning to all of the local excitations”.18 
Animals respond to certain aspects of the external situation according to 
what, for them, makes sense: they do not encounter objects as mere things, 
but relative to vital needs:19 activity organises around the attractive or 
repellent, which do not reduce to physicochemical properties. 
Accordingly, ‘stimuli’ are not elementary properties, but the 
arrangement between organism and milieu. 
The Structure of Behaviour (2): From Living Form to Human Order 
Merleau-Ponty offers the concept of form to describe this arrangement 
irreducible to mechanism. Form exists for active organisms. It does not 
describe a mere “additive whole”,20 but “total processes whose properties 
are not the sum of those which the isolated parts would possess”.21 The 
reciprocal relation of organism and milieu is “the creation of certain 
relations” that compose “a unity of meaning” or signification.22 Situation 
and reaction are internally linked: they are “two moments of a circular 
process”23 that constitutes the structure that is “the mode of activity 
proper to the organism”.24 Behaviour traces animal being-in-the-world 
as it carves out an opening onto the world, or “that part that is adequate 
                                               
18  Merleau-Ponty, SB 14. Here Merleau-Ponty draws upon Jakob von Uexküll. A Foray into 
the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With 'A Theory of Meaning', trans. Joseph D O'Neill 
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
19  Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, trans. Leonard  
Lawlor and Ted Toadvine (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
20  Ibid., 218. Without vitalism, or without this having mere subjective reality. 
21  Merleau-Ponty, SB 49. 
22  Ibid., 87. 
23  Ibid., 130. 
24  Ibid., 130. That animals contribute to this process suggests that stimulus cannot be defined 
independently of organism. 
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to it”.25 This signification that is vital behaviour is part of the organism’s 
reality, which is “not substantial but structural”.26 
The move from lower to higher behaviour does not entail a new 
category, only differentiation between “degrees of integration”.27 
Merleau-Ponty specifies three such Gestalten: physical, vital and human. 
Physical order describes an equilibrium constituted relative to an external 
limit, whose activity tends towards rest.28 Only with the biological or 
vital order does behaviour appear.29 Here, an organism “executes a work 
beyond its proper limits”,30 to actively establish its Umwelt “with respect 
to conditions which are only virtual and which the system itself brings 
into existence”.31 Within this living behavior, Merleau-Ponty 
differentiates further between different degrees of autonomy.32 In 
syncretic forms, behaviour is fully submerged in a concrete situation. In 
amovable form, behaviours relate to contextual signals, but remain 
correlated with situations like those from which they emerged.33 
The human order adds a “third dialectic”:34 production of new structures. 
Thanks to symbolic form, behaviour can be liberated both from specific 
                                               
25 Ibid., 105. 
26 Ibid., 139. We might suggest that form has objectivity, albeit of an ontological status other 
than that of its contiguous material parts. 
27 Ibid., 133. 
28 It is “obtained with respect to certain given external conditions” that might be 
“topographical… as in the distribution of electrical charges on a conductor; or… conditions 
which are themselves dynamic, as in the case of a drop of oil placed in the middle of a mass 
of water”. Ibid., 145.  
29 “… which is to say that… actions are not comprehensible as functions of the physical 
milieu”. Ibid., 159. “… one says of a man or of an animal that he behaves; one does not say 
it of an acid, an electron, a pebble or a cloud except by metaphor” (2/225 fn.3). 
30 Ibid., 145-6. 
31 Ibid., 145-6. 
32 This turns on whether the structure is “submerged in the content, or… emerges from it to 
become… the proper theme of activity” Ibid., 103. 
33 Ibid., 105. 
34 Ibid., 162. 
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situations and species-defined ‘functional values’, to become the “proper 
theme of the activity that tends to express it”.35 It is available for a 
plurality of points of view, and can take objects as simultaneously 
available for multiple uses.36 This furnishes the existential capacity of 
“orientating oneself in relation to the possible”.37 This inaugurates the 
human world proper, and makes possible “new cycles of behaviour” 
(which amounts to the same thing).38 For humans, projects and purposes, 
and values underpinning these, appear against a structured, human 
background: ‘nascent perception’ is of a human milieu. Yet such 
structures can be thematised, abstracted, accorded ”new significance”, 
and finally surpassed.39 This makes the human dialectic ambiguous (or, 
paradoxical): the self-same activity that engenders what apparently 
determinate structures has “as its meaning to reject them and to surpass 
them”.40 
Landes on Merleau-Ponty and Simondon 
Landes finds a paradoxical logic implicit in even this early work. 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of reflex reveals a form of paradoxical, 
“directed activity between blind mechanism and intelligent behaviour”.41 
Even basic, animal behaviours are orientated according to “current 
                                               
35 Ibid., 120. Put otherwise, behaviour “no longer has only signification, [but] is itself 
signification”. Ibid., 122. 
36 As “two aspects of an identical thing”. Ibid., 116. Put otherwise, human symbolic behaviour 
introduces a new element: human action takes place, as it were, ‘under a description’. The 
same movement means something different—is a different act or behaviour—according to 
the description or context. 
37 Ibid., 176. 
38 Ibid., 162. 
39 Ibid., 179. 
40 Ibid., 176. 
41 Landes, MPE 64. 
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positions and potential movements”,42 addressed to a future situation that 
is not yet actual: what Landes calls, in his language of expression, a 
“future paradoxical ideal weight”.43 Even simple behaviour, then, “is 
expression”:44 activity wherein an interior expresses itself on the outside, 
where the interior does not preexist, but is produced though, the 
expression. 
Similarly, more complex behaviours “respond to the situation by 
playing forward a past that is thereby paradoxically altered”.45 Bodily 
behaviour and gesture has its own kind of intelligence or “expressive 
creativity”:46 it is a “moving expression of its past and present towards a 
future that is present as metastable”.47 Landes suggests that nascent 
perception is already paradoxical, or ambiguous, as always self-
transcending towards the ‘virtual’. The form or sense that grounds 
activity, then, is not only taken up but transformed: every activity 
“instates new lines of force” in an existing field. This makes the human 
situation dynamic: activity is “creation in the face of an evolving 
situation”, orientated in virtue of ”unpredictable future encounters”.48 
Response (1): From Form to Information 
While recognising that Landes claims only that Merleau-Ponty tends 
towards the kind of equilibrium Simondon will eventually describe, a 
cursory response to this encounter might still wonder whether a tension 
exists between their respective positions concerning perception and 
                                               
42 Ibid., 64. 
43 Ibid., 64. 
44 Ibid., 60. 
45 Ibid., 66. 
46 Ibid., 64. 
47 Ibid., 64. 
48 Ibid., 72. 
11 
sense. For Merleau-Ponty, bodily experience is founded in perception. 
This emphasis upon perceptual primacy obtains throughout his work: 
there is always presupposition of, and grounding in, primordial 
perceptual sense. In SB, form plays this role. 
In Simondon’s problematic, however, the preindividual is an 
ontogenetic operation that exists, as it were, one stage earlier. The 
preindividual cannot correlate with perception or, crucially, any notion 
of sense. It is by nature prior to the individual, whereas sense, however 
indeterminate or paradoxical, is a relation between individual and milieu 
that is already individuated, to a greater or lesser extent. 
Landes combines Merleau-Ponty and Simondon to give a robust 
notion of the potential for transformation within the order of expression. 
The body draws upon something latent within past and present, to create 
a future difference. He calls bodily movement a “paradoxical response”, 
insofar as it plays forward the past and present towards “a new situation, 
something that comes from an alternatively-configured one that shares 
neither its content nor its material form, but its sense”.49 I wonder 
whether conceiving this operation in terms of shared sense might not 
inhibit creative expressive potential, even if this is not fully grasped until 
the gesture is completed. A tension exists, then, between Merleau-
Ponty’s position, where form is the “ultimate ground”,50 and Simondon’s, 
where the foundation resides in the movement, as yet incommensurable 
with form or sense, out of which sense emerges. This runs the risk of 
turning form into something that exists in advance and then undergoes 
transformation, rather than something that is, as it were, composed 
through and as transformation. 
                                               
49 Ibid., 64. 
50 Ibid., 68. 
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I offer this tension as a topic for discussion. However, a potential 
response might be to bolster the processual dimension of sense, by 
supplanting the priority of form with the process of taking-form: the 
movement from preindividual towards sense,51 that Simondon calls 
information. This is the “formula of individuation” that regulates how, in 
this case, sense, will emerge, but does not preexist this operation, and is 
gradually elaborated through the transductive process of individuation.52 
Response (2): From Equilibria to Problems 
We could build this out further by recalling Simondon’s assertion that 
being is inherently problematic. As noted, a problem emerges when a 
burgeoning tension within the preindividual reservoir of some domain 
leads to dephasing. This dephasing is the elaboration of the problem; the 
individual, by individuating itself, resolves the tension. Returning to 
bodily behaviour, this could be understood as a problem of varying 
orientation within a diverse world that ceaselessly insists in ways that 
are only partially predictable, and that solicits expressive responses. 
Making problems central to expressive bodily behaviour allows us to 
avoid a tendency to overemphasise minimisation or even elimination of 
tension, as epitomised by Hubert Dreyfus’ notion of skilful coping.53 
Dreyfus claims that in learning, agents gradually surpass general rules 
from which learning begins, to eventually respond spontaneously, non-
reflectively but intelligently to the situation in question. This entire 
                                               
51 Is metastability the metastable of the expressed, or does the expressed express the metastable? 
52 “… l’information est la formule de l'individuation, formule qui ne peut pre ́exister a ̀ cette 
individuation” Simondon, IL 31.  
53 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Return of the Myth of the Mental", Inquiry 50, no. 4 (2007): 352-
365; "Intelligence Without Representation—Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental 
Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation", 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 (2002): 367-383. 
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process is guaranteed by the propensity to maintain what Merleau-Ponty 
calls ‘optimal grip’: the tendency to implicitly reorient the body in order 
to discern its object most adequately relative to current concerns. For 
Dreyfus, this is not merely an important aspect of, or even structure 
within, embodied experience. It is strongly normative: we are at our most 
human when coping, which is intelligent but spontaneous smoothing 
over tensions in activity. 
As we have seen, SB already provides a different, arguably more 
nuanced, take on this phenomenon. For Merleau-Ponty, overcoming 
structures and creating new ones is characteristically human, which 
precisely involves thematisation of, not immersion in, a behavioural 
context. Indeed, skillful coping might be closer to what Merleau-Ponty 
would consider amovable, or even syncretic, behaviour, correlated tightly 
with a context. While in SB human behaviour shuttles between degrees 
of integration, only creatively surpassing structure expresses their 
proper being. Moreover, by enjoining Simondon to suggest that 
behaviour is a moving trajectory of metastable equilibriums, Landes only 
strengthens this reading. For Simondon, problems or paradoxes are 
centrally implicated in the emergence of the new. They indicate that 
something cannot be straightforwardly absorbed into the existing state 
of affairs, that it demands a creative response. Behaviour is a continual 
tension and release. A spontaneous grip on the world, that instigates a 
bodily form or sense, occurs alongside the creative inauguration and 
resolution of problems as the body moves through more or less familiar 
situations. The crucial difference is this: for Dreyfus elimination of 
tension is a telos. This, Jack Reynolds suggests, denies problems and 
14 
tensions them their “incendiary power”.54 Problems and paradoxes, 
however, introduce something irreducible to the current equilibrium, 
that can surpass it towards the future. Problems are not something 
accidental that some individual needs to solve to restore a stable 
equilibrium. Building from Landes’ reading of the metastability of 
behaviour, we can suggest that formation of and response to problems—
and the concomitant creative instigation of merely metastable 
equilibriums of sense—is a foundational aspect of expressive bodily 
being. 
                                               
54 Jack Reynolds, "Dreyfus and Deleuze on l’Habitude, Coping, and Trauma in Skill 
Acquisition", International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14, no. 4 (2006). 
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